Rationales of Mortgage Insurance Premium Structures by Barry Dennis et al.
Introduction
Currently, different premium structures are used by various insurance/guarantee
agencies, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veteran’s Administration
(VA), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mae), and private mortgage insurance companies
(PMIs). These insurance programs charge combinations of upfront and annual
premiums, and premium refunds are provided when a loan is prepaid within a relatively
short period of time. Given these different structures, the insurer will realize different
revenue patterns over time. In addition, total premiums incurred by a borrower who
prepays or defaults vary by the premium structure and the time of default/prepayment.
The rationales for using different premium structures from either the borrowers’ or the
insurers’ perspectives have not yet been studied in a rigorous manner.
Numerous mortgage default pricing articles have been published over the last two
decades. Von Furstenberg (1969), Vandell (1978), Jackson and Kaseman (1980), and
Swan (1982) study the value of mortgage default risk using econometric models.
Campbell and Dietrich (1983) and Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) address the pricing of
mortgage default risk and mortgage insurance with a utility maximization approach.
Foster and Van Order (1984), Epperson, Kau, Keenan, and Muller (1985), and
Cunningham and Hendershott (1984) use contingent claim pricing approaches to price
mortgage default risk. Kau, Keenan, Muller, and Epperson (1992), study the value of
default risk when prepayments and defaults are interrelated. Cunningham and Capone
(1990), Ambrose and Capone (1996), and Deng and Calhoun (1997) focus their studies
on the estimation of mortgage termination rates with historical data. Deng, Quigley and
Van Order (1994) develop a conditional hazard model to estimate the default function.
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Abstract. This study examines the rationales for the design of mortgage insurance premium
structures. The actuarially sound premium prices of several widely used structures are
formally derived. Two types of cross-subsidization are identiﬁed in different structures: (1)
subsidization across termination years and (2) extra-subsidization of defaulters by non-
defaulters. Because these two types of subsidization exist to different degree among the
structures, a borrower may self-select into certain structures to maximize (minimize) the
beneﬁts (losses) of cross-subsidies. Adverse selection arises when the borrower’s
characteristics cannot be completely observed by the insurer. The actuarially sound
premium prices should be adjusted for such adverse selection behaviors. Numerical
examples are provided to illustrate such adjustments.Most of these papers focus on the valuation of default risk as a lump sum (upfront
premium). However, literature that goes beyond the valuation of upfront premiums to
study the effects of using different premium structures to cover default risk is almost
nonexistent.
Mortgage insurance differs from other types of insurance in several respects. These
differences make it difﬁcult to adopt techniques developed elsewhere in the insurance
industry. First, casualty insurance covers a single period, so the historical performance of
a particular policy can be used in determining the premium to be charged in subsequent
periods. This information cannot be used in determining mortgage insurance premiums,
because mortgage insurance covers multiple periods, and the premium for the life of the
mortgage is deﬁned at the origination date. Second, in contrast to life insurance,
mortgage insurance has a deﬁnite termination date and the claim risk decreases rather
than increases over time due to the amortization schedule. Third, with proper geographic
diversiﬁcation, other types of insurers can usually reduce risk exposure to a minimum;
however, because the prepayment and default rates of mortgages are highly dependent on
macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, house price growth rates, and household
income (or unemployment rates), substantial systematic risk is involved in mortgage
insurance. Finally, when mortgage insurance is mandatory it covers the risk to the lender
rather than the risk to the borrower. The borrower has no right to switch insurance
companies or to be temporarily uninsured without terminating the existing mortgage
loan. Given these unique features, the design of premium structures and the calculation
of mortgage insurance premiums deserve careful study.
This research studies the rationales of the design of mortgage insurance premium
structures. We develop a framework to calculate mortgage premiums for different
structures based on exogenous termination probabilities. The insurer’s objective is to
collect premiums to cover the expected claim costs and earn economic proﬁt.
Throughout this study, economic value refers to the return commensurate with the level
of risk being taken by the insurer. Different premium structures that combine upfront
premiums, annual premiums, and/or premium refunds can be designed to fulﬁll such
requirements. Insurers do not have information, however, about the tenure plans and
default risks of individual borrowers. Borrowers who differ in these respects incur
different total insurance premiums under different structures and, therefore, have an
incentive to choose one structure over another. The FHA and PMI structures are used to
illustrate this effect. We ﬁnd that when not constrained by underwriting guidelines,
borrowers with shorter tenure plans have an incentive to choose the FHA structure over
the PMI structure. Properly designed premium structures can reduce the problem caused
by information asymmetry. We ﬁnd that two types of subsidization inherent within
mortgage insurance pricing structures play a key role in the effect of these premium
structures. These forms of subsidy are (1) termination year subsidization and (2) extra
defaulter subsidization. 
The next section describes several existing premium structures. Section three develops
the framework for determining insurance premium structures. Section four analyzes the
ex-post performance of various structures and discusses the effect of heterogeneous
borrowers with asymmetric information. The ﬁfth section provides numerical examples
of existing premium structures, the incentive effect on the behavior of borrowers, and the
effect of different pricing approaches on the issuers. The last section draws conclusions
about our ﬁndings and their implications.
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The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage guarantee programs charge borrowers ﬁxed
premium rates of about 25 basis points of the remaining balance throughout the life of
the mortgage. While premium rates can vary by lenders, they do not vary among
mortgages with different characteristics nor do they vary by the age of the mortgage. The
value of premium income under such a structure may not match the expected net present
value of potential losses faced by a lender during different stages of a mortgage. For
example, the default risk during the early years of a mortgage is usually much higher than
that during the later years. Furthermore, the dollar amount of loss to the lender is usually
lower during the later years of the mortgage due to amortization. A rational premium
structure should reﬂect these patterns. That is, at any point in time, the value of mortgage
insurance premium income should match the expected net present value of the potential
loss over the remaining life of the mortgage.
The premium rates of mortgage insurance provided by FHA vary with the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, the type of mortgage (purchase or reﬁnance), and the term of the
mortgage. Loans with higher LTV ratio or longer terms are charged higher premium
rates. The premiums for streamline reﬁnance loans are lower than those for purchase
loans. Between September 1, 1983 and September 30, 1991, FHA charged an upfront
premium of 3.8% without any annual premiums. Since 1992, FHA premiums have been
structured so that both upfront premiums and annual premiums are collected.
Currently, thirty-year FHA mortgage insurance has an upfront premium rate of 2.25%
and an annual premium rate of 0.5% of the remaining balance for ﬁve, eight and ten
years for loans with LTV ratios below 90%, between 90% and 95%, and above 95%,
respectively. When an FHA borrower prepays before the end of the seventh year of the
mortgage’s life, the FHA will refund a portion of the upfront premium. The percentage
of the refund decreases from 98% in the ﬁrst year after origination to 8% in the seventh
year. An FHA thirty-year streamlined reﬁnancing has an upfront premium rate of
2.25% and annual premium rates of 0.5% for seven years. Since no appraisal is required
in FHA reﬁnancing, no LTV information is available and premiums vary only with the
term of the mortgage. 
Private mortgage insurers offer a variety of insurance programs. The premiums they
charge are functions of mortgage balance, LTV, loan type such as ﬁxed-rate mortgage
(FRM) or adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), the term length, the cap rate of the ARM,
the buydown provision, the coverage of the loss, and the frequency of payments. Unlike
FHA insurance, which charges the same premium rates for FRMs and ARMs, PMIs
charge higher premiums for ARMs than for FRMs. The premium rates for FRMs
increase with the term of the mortgage and those for ARMs increase with the magnitude
of the cap rate. Temporary buydowns have the same premium rates as the ARMs with a
1% cap rate. 
According to the frequency of the payments, typical PMI programs can be classiﬁed as
monthly premiums, level annuals, standard annuals, and super singles (see descriptions
below). For monthly and annual premium payments, borrowers can choose between
constant renewal and amortized (or declining) renewal. In constant renewal programs,
premium rates are multiplied by the original loan amount to calculate the payment, while
in amortized renewal, premium rates higher than those in the constant renewal are
applied to the remaining balance. The amortized renewal rates typically remain the same
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amortized renewal rates in the ﬁrst ten years after the origination and adjusted downward
for the period from the eleventh year to term. 
Because the rates charged by different private insurers are either the same or very
similar, we report the rates based upon information from a typical insurer. In the monthly
premium program, the monthly premiums are calculated according to annualized
premium rates. The annualized premium rates based upon amortized loan balances are
the same for the ﬁrst year and subsequent renewal years. For a thirty-year FRM with
LTV between 90.01% and 95% and loss coverage of 30%, the amortized renewal rate is
0.78%. For a 2% ARM, the comparable rate is 0.92%. 
In the standard annuals program, the premium rate for the ﬁrst year is greater than the
renewal rate. For a thirty-year FRM with LTV from 90.015 to 95% and loss coverage of
30%, the ﬁrst year premium rate is 1.45%, the amortized renewal rate is 0.49%, and the
constant renewal rate for years 11 through expiration is 0.25%. In the level annuals
program, the rates for the ﬁrst year are the same as the amortized renewal rates. For a
thirty-year FRM with the same LTV and loss coverage, the amortized level annual
premium rate is 0.74% and the constant renewal rate for years 11 through term is 0.20%. 
In the single plans and super single programs, premiums are paid up front. Single
plans provide coverage for the ﬁrst three, ﬁve, seven, or ten years of the life of the
mortgage; super single programs insure against default until the loan is paid in full. For
thirty-year loans, single plans are refundable if the contracts are canceled before the
expiration of the insurance plan. The refund schedule for super singles vary with the term
of the loans and may also vary with the origination LTV. For example, thirty-year loans
use ten-year schedules, and ﬁfteen-year loans use ﬁve-year refund schedules. The
refundable upfront premium rate is 4.80% percent for thirty-year FRMs and 2.9% for
ﬁfteen/twenty-year FRMs. 
Note that the monthly and annual PMI premiums are refundable at prepayment for
the fraction of the month or the year that has not passed. However, this type of refund
differs from the upfront premium refund that could occur more than one year after the
premium payment. The refund of the latest monthly or annual premium is of limited
interest and is not applicable in the discrete time model discussed in the next section.
Thus, we address only the refund of the upfront premium after the ﬁrst year of
origination. 
The Model
A Framework for Determining Insurance Premium Structures
In this section, we present a framework under which feasible insurance premium
structures can be constructed. A feasible premium structure is deﬁned as one such that
the present value of the expected loss (plus a gross margin) for the insurer is equal to that
of the expected premium revenues. Assume the term of the mortgage is T periods with
payments to be made at time 1, . . . , T. Mortgage loans are originated at the current
period, time 0. In each period, a borrower determines whether to default, prepay, or
make the payment. The conditional default and prepayment rates at time t are given by
dt and pt. The conditional probability that a borrower will stay current at time t is
ct512dt2pt. When a borrower defaults, the insurer is assumed to incur a loss that is
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the instant after the time t payment by Bt and the ratio of the loss to the unpaid principal
balance by LR. The loss ratio LR is assumed constant throughout the mortgage term. The
present value of the expected accumulated loss for the lender from the present to time t,
denoted by EALt, is: 
(1)
where R is deﬁned as one plus the discount rate used for calculating the present value of
loss and revenue and ELt is the present value of the expected loss arising from time t
default:
(2)
Denote the ratio of time t insurance premium payment to Bt by at and the ratio of
refund to B0 by ft. Denote the present value of the expected accumulated revenue from





We assume that the present value of the expected revenue is equal to (11q) times the
present value of the expected accumulated loss, i.e., the insurers earn a gross proﬁt
margin of 1003q percentage. Note that this does not necessarily mean that the gross
margin is constant and equal to q in each period. Depending upon the premium
structure, the insurers may be expected to lose or make money at any speciﬁc period.
However, across the mortgage life, the insurers are expected to earn a proﬁt even though
they may lose money in some periods. The equilibrium condition for lenders is:
(5)
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RATIONALES OF MORTGAGE INSURANCE PREMIUM STRUCTURES 363In what follows, we discuss alternative premium structures that satisfy lender
equilibrium conditions. A premium structure is characterized by the combination of
premium rates (a0, a1, . . . , aT21) and refund rates  (f1, f2, . . . , fT11).
Case 1: Level annual premium rate, no upfront premium, no refund.
In Case 1, the premium collected at time t is proportional to the time t balance Bt.
Because the default rates for a pool of mortgages do not remain constant over the life of
the portfolio, the premium paid at time t is not equal to the expected loss arising from the
default risk at time t11. Thus, cross-subsidies exist among borrowers who terminate
mortgages during different policy years. The equilibrium condition is EART215
(11q)EALT subject to a5a05a15. . .5aT21 and f15f25. . .5fT21=0, which implies:
(6)
Case 2: Upfront premium only, no annual premium, no refund. 
In Case 2, only upfront premiums are collected but none of the premium is to be
refunded when a borrower prepays. The equilibrium premium that the insurer requires is
(11q)EALT.
Case 3: Upfront premium only, unused premium refunded when borrowers prepay, no
annual premium.
Given the conditional default and prepayment rates, we want to determine the upfront
premium and the refund schedule according to which the unused premiums are refunded.
The unused premium is deﬁned as the portion of the upfront premium covering the time
periods from after the prepayment to the end of the term. Thus, the earlier a borrower
prepays, the larger the proportion of the upfront premium to be refunded. The total up-
front premium can be considered the sum of the premiums paid in advance for insuring
against the default risk in each period with the condition of refunding unused premiums
upon prepayment. Let gt be such that gtB0 is the portion of the refundable upfront
premium for insuring against the time t default risk. The ratio of the refundable upfront
premium to the original loan amount, denoted by a0, can be written as: 
(7)
The premium to be refunded at time t is equal to ftB0, where: 
(8)
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be refunded. Substituting equation 7 and equation 8 into equation 4 and letting at50 for




is the expected premium revenue from insuring against the time t default risk. ERDt can
be better understood by setting v5R. In this case, it is obvious that ERDt is the product
of the portion of the upfront premium for insuring against time t default and the
probability that the borrower will not prepay before time t so that the insurer will keep
this premium. The probability that the insurer will not refund the time t portion of the
upfront premium is equal to one minus the unconditional probability that the borrower
will prepay before time t. In general, v ≠ R, and equation 10 indicates that the expected
net premium revenue from insuring against the time t default risk is equal to the
refundable upfront premium for time t default minus the present value of the expected
premium refund in all the periods before time t. By imposing the condition that equates
the expected loss and expected premium revenue derived from insuring against the time t
default risk, we have: 
(11)
Substituting equation 2 and equation 9 into equation 11 and solving for gt yields:
(12)
Case 4: Upfront premium ﬁnanced, no refund, no annual premium
When the upfront premium is ﬁnanced and therefore amortized, the borrowers pay a
ﬁxed amount of premium in each period until the mortgage is terminated. When a
borrower prepays, the unpaid premium balance will be due immediately. However, the
unpaid premium balance at the instant before the prepayment is equal to the present
value of the future premium payments if the borrower did not prepay. The present value
of the premium payment for the prepayers does not depend on when the prepayment
occurs. The accumulated expected premium revenue for Case 4 is:
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where m is the premium payment in each period. From equation 5 and equation 13, we
solve m to be:
(14)
The present value of the premium payments for a non-defaulter is: 
(15)
Comparison of Alternative Premium Structures—Algebraic Approach
Given a premium structure discussed in the above section, the ex-post premium payment
made by a borrower depends upon the premium structure and the behavior of the
borrower. We ﬁrst compare the ex-post payments for borrowers under the same premium
structure but with different behaviors. Then we compare the ex-post payments for one
borrower under different premium structures. The implication of this analysis is that
borrowers with different expectations of mobility and default will have different
preferences for speciﬁc premium structures. 
We compare the ex-post payment for three types of borrowers: borrowers who hold the
mortgage until maturity (accumulated premium payments denoted by NDNP),
borrowers who default at time t and s (accumulated premium payments denoted by DFt
and DFs, t > s), and borrowers who prepay at time t and s (accumulated premium
payments denoted by PPt and PPs).
Comparison within the Same Premium Structure
Case 1: Annual Premium Only. Since there is no refund, borrowers who default and
prepay at the same time pay the same insurance premiums. The earlier borrowers
terminate the mortgage, the smaller the premium payments are. Thus the borrowers who
hold the mortgage until the maturity date pay the highest premiums. 
(16)
Case 2: Upfront Premium Only, No Refund. Because there is no refund and no annual
premiums, the premium payments for all types of borrowers are the same.
(17)      NDNP DF PP DF PP t s t t s s = = = = > .
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VOLUME 14, NUMBER 3, 1997Case 3: Upfront Premium with Refund, No Annual Premiums. In the upfront with refund
case, defaulters pay the same premiums as borrowers holding the mortgage to maturity
because neither receives a refund. The premium payments for prepayers are less than
those for the defaulters, and the earlier the borrowers prepay, the lower are the total
payments.
(18)
Case 4: Upfront Premium with Financing, No Refund, No Annual Premiums. In the
upfront with ﬁnancing case, defaulters pay the least amount of premiums and prepayers
pay the same amount of premiums as borrowers holding the mortgages to maturity. The
earlier a borrower defaults, the less the total premium payment is. 
(19)
Comparison of Alternative Premium Structures
The comparison of the present value of ex-post premium payments is based upon the
premium schedules obtained from a set of default and prepayment probabilities and a
ﬁxed gross margin. We separately compare payments for defaulters, prepayers and
borrowers holding mortgages to maturity. We use superscripts AN, UF, RF, FG to
represent Cases 1–4, respectively. For example, DFt
UF represents the ex-post payment for
time t defaulters under the upfront premium structure (Case 2). The deﬁnitions and
abbreviated names for these four cases are summarized as below: 
Case Description Abbreviated Name
1 Annual premium only, no upfront premium Annual case
2 Upfront premium only, no refund, no ﬁnancing Upfront case
3 Upfront premium with refund, no ﬁnancing Refund case
4 Upfront premium with ﬁnancing, no refund Financing case
Borrowers Holding Mortgages to Maturity. For borrowers holding mortgages to maturity,
the payment in the Upfront case is lower than that in the Annual case because in the
Annual case both defaulters and prepayers are paying less than borrowers holding the
mortgages to term. In comparison with the Upfront case, under the Annual case
borrowers holding the mortgages to maturity, as well as the late defaulters and prepayers,
must pay higher premiums to make up for the lower premiums paid by the early
defaulters and prepayers. The premium payment in the Refund case is greater than that in
the  Upfront case because the Refund case prepayers are refunded for the unused
premiums while the Upfront case prepayers are not. The premium payments made by
early defaulters are lower in the Annual case than those in the Refund case, implying that
borrowers holding mortgages to maturity will pay more in the Annual case than under the
Refund case. The relationship of the accumulated payments for borrowers holding
mortgages to maturity is:
     NDNP PP PP DF DF t s t s t s = = > > > .
     NDNP DF DF PP PP t s t s t s = = > > > .
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Defaulters. The relationship of payments made by defaulters under different premium
structures is a function of the time of default. For the Annual case and the Upfront case,
there exists a time of default (tC1C2) such that: 
(21)
Similarly, for the Annual case and the Refund case, there exists a time of default tC1C3
(tC1C3 >tC1C2) such that: 
(22)
The payments for defaulters in the Refund case are higher than those in the Upfront case,
i.e., DFt
RF > DFt
UF. The difference between the payment made by a defaulter in the Up-
front case and that in the Refund case is positively correlated with prepayment rates. A
defaulter’s premium payments in the Refund case reduce to those in the Upfront case
when the rates of prepayment are zero. Under normal circumstances when the
prepayment rates are not expected to be close to zero, a defaulter’s payment in the
Financing case is always below that in the Annual case. However, when prepayment rates
are expected to be very low, the relative size of the premium payment between the Annual
case and the Financing case depends upon the time of default. Early defaulters pay lower
premium in the Financing case than in the Annual case but the late defaulters pay higher
premium in the Financing case than in the Annual case. 
Prepayers. Borrower premium payments in the Refund case (PPt
RF) are lower than those
in the Annual case (PPt
AN) if the prepayment occurs in the early and late policy years, but
may become larger than those in the Annual case if the prepayment occurs during the
periods of high default probability. PPt
RF is also lower than DFt
RF and approaches it as t
approaches T . The prepayers always pay more in the Financing case than in the Upfront
case because insurers lose the unamortized premium balance in the Financing case once
default occurs. The premium payments in the Annual case and the Refund case are lower
than those in the Upfront case and the Financing case for early prepayers but higher for
late prepayers. 
Numerical Results
To illustrate the above framework and compare the alternative premium programs, we
constructed numerical examples. The underlying conditional prepayment and default
rates used to determine the fair insurance premium rates for the four programs are
reported in Price Waterhouse LLP (1997). The actual FHA default and prepayment
experience is computed for policy years 1 to 22 and the remaining years are estimated
with grouped logit models. The rates are estimated by taking a simple average across all
thirty-year ﬁxed-rate mortgages for each policy year. The resulting default and
prepayment rates are displayed in Exhibit 1. 
     
DF DF if t t













     
DF DF if t t




















368 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 3, 1997Given the conditional prepayment and default rates, we calculated the premium
schedule for each structure case assuming zero net present values for the insurers and a
claim loss rate of 40% of the remaining principal balance. Expressed as a percentage of
the initial loan amount, the premium rates are 0.55% per annum for the Annual case,
3.36% for the Upfront case, 4.04% for the Refund case, and 3.76% for the Financing case.
Borrower’s Perspective: Comparison of Alternative Premium Paid by Premium Structures
Exhibits 2 and 3 display the present value of the ex-post premium payments for prepayers
and defaulters, respectively, by year of termination. The dramatic difference in total
premiums paid, depending upon year of termination and premium program, is apparent
in these exhibits. These differences in total premiums paid provide incentives for
borrowers to select the most ﬁnancially advantageous program, i.e., the program with
lowest total cost. Which program is most attractive to a prepayer depends upon the year
in which termination occurs.
The relationship between total premiums paid under the different premium programs
and by termination year is based largely upon the extent to which either of two types of
subsidization is implicit in the programs: (1) subsidization across termination years, and
(2) subsidization of defaulters by non-defaulters. To the extent premiums are charged
each year equal to the present value of the expected future loss in the respective year, no
subsidy across termination years will exist. However, for a given book of business, i.e.,
mortgage loans originated during the same year, this program would require an annual
premium that varies by year. In addition, the premium pattern would be different for
each book of business due to differences in expected loss patterns by book. For simplicity,
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Exhibit 1
FHA Conditional Prepayment and Default Rates
These conditional prepayment and default rates are based upon Price Waterhouse LLP (1997). The
rates are estimated by taking simple averages across all thirty-year ﬁxed-rate mortgages for each
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Exhibit 2
Ex-Post Present Value of Premiums Paid by Borrowers Who Prepay 
at Different Point in Time
The numbers are presented as percentages of initial loan amounts. The premium payments are
based upon the rates that generate zero net present values under the FHA prepayment and default
rates shown in Exhibit 1. The rates are 0.55% per annum for the annual-only case, 3.36% for the up-
front-only case, 4.04% for the upfront with refund case, and 3.76% for the ﬁnancing upfront case.
Exhibit 3
Ex-Post Present Value of Premiums Paid by Borrowers that Default 
at Different Point in Time
The numbers are presented as percentages of initial loan amounts. The premium payments are
based upon the rates that generate zero net present values under the FHA prepayment and default
rates shown in Exhibit 1. The rates are 0.55% per annum for the annual only case, 3.36% for the up-
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— 5 — Annual Only — l — Upfront Only
—A— Financing Upfront — 3 — Upfront Refundmost annual premium programs charge a constant premium rate that results in premiums
being less than future expected losses during the early years of the policy and premiums
being greater than future expected losses during later years of the policy. Thus, borrowers
who do not prepay or prepay later in the life of the loan subsidize borrowers who prepay
early in the life of their loan.
Even if an actuarially sound premium is charged that matches the timing of the
premium with the pattern of expected future losses, non-defaulters will subsidize
defaulters (that is the nature of insurance). However, the structure of some premium
programs result in defaulters not even paying an actuarially sound total premium, while
non-defaulters pay a greater than actuarially sound total premium amount. In such cases,
non-defaulters are “extra-subsidizing” defaulters.
It is possible to generally categorize premium structures as being termination year
subsidizers or defaulter extra-subsidizers. However, the same premium program may not
have the same subsidization implications for both prepayers and defaulters. For example,
for prepayers, the Upfront case and the Financing case are heavy termination year
subsidizer programs. In both cases, the present value of the total premium paid is
invariant with regard to termination year, so early prepayers pay a premium that is larger
than the present value of expected future losses and late prepayers pay a total premium
that is lower than future expected losses. The Annual cases and the Refund case have less
implicit termination year subsidization because the present value of total premiums paid
varies by termination year. Given an actuarially sound refund schedule, the Refund case
would match net premiums paid to the present value of expected future losses, and thus
would have no implicit termination year subsidization.
Referring to Exhibit 2, borrowers prepaying in year 6 or earlier ﬁnancially prefer the
Annual case or the Refund case to either the Upfront premium case or the Financing case,
while borrowers prepaying after six years have the opposite preference. This preference
pattern results from the greater amount of termination year subsidization inherent in the
two upfront premium without refund cases (the Upfront case and the Financing case)
relative to the Annual case and the Refund case. The least preferred premium program for
late prepayers (after year 11) is the Annual case.
While both the Upfront case and the Financing case have identical degrees of
termination year subsidization, the total premium cost to the Financing case prepayers is
greater than that to the Upfront case prepayers because the Financing case has a greater
amount of extra defaulter subsidization than the Upfront case. In the Upfront case both
prepayers and defaulters pay the same upfront premium, none of which is refunded no
matter what the timing or reason for termination. In contrast, under the Financing case,
the premium is included in the loan principal amount and amortized over the life of the
loan. Early prepayers must pay the unpaid principal balance and the unpaid premium.
However, when a borrower defaults he defaults both on the unpaid principal balance and
on the unpaid premium. Thus, the present value of the amortized premium equals the
amount of the upfront premium (as long as the discount rate equals the mortgage interest
rate) for prepayers, but is less than the amount of the upfront premium for defaulters.
Therefore, non-defaulters must pay a higher premium to make up for the nonpayment by
defaulters, resulting in extra defaulter subsidization.
After year 11, total premiums in the Refund case become increasingly lower than those
in the Annual case. This occurs because the Refund case has signiﬁcantly less extra
defaulter subsidization than the Annual case does after year 11. While both the Annual
RATIONALES OF MORTGAGE INSURANCE PREMIUM STRUCTURES 371case and the Refund case match expected future losses fairly closely through year 11, at
that point in time defaults decline markedly. This decline in future defaults is reﬂected in
the refund schedule of the Refund case, but is not reﬂected in the Annual case which
continues to remain unchanged. Under the Annual case, defaulters avoid paying annual
premiums for the remainder of the loan period. However, since defaulters lose their refund
under the Refund case, they effectively still pay the premium that covers the remainder of
the loan term. Thus, the Refund case has a reduced extra defaulter subsidization.
Exhibit 3 displays similar information for defaulters. The Financing case is the most
preferred for all but the latest defaulters. This general preference for the Financing case is
due to the heavy implicit extra defaulter subsidization. The Upfront case and the Refund
case have substantial implicit termination year subsidization for defaulters, while the
Annual case and the Financing case have less. Thus, for both prepayers and defaulters,
upfront premiums have substantial termination year subsidization. While for prepayers,
the Financing case has substantial termination year subsidization, for defaulters this case
has much less termination year subsidization. This occurs because, since defaulters
default on the unpaid amortized premium, the later they default the more total premium
they pay. Non-defaulters pay the same total present value premium regardless of when
they prepay. In contrast, the Refund case has substantial termination year subsidization
for defaulters since they give up their refund upon default and therefore pay the 
same total premium regardless of when they default. The Refund case has the least
termination year subsidization for prepayers.
In summary, early prepayers (through year 7) will tend to choose either the Annual
case or the Refund case, while later prepayers will prefer the Upfront case. All but the
latest defaulters (after year 22) will tend to choose the Financing case. The latest
defaulters, like prepayers, will choose the Upfront case.
Insurer’s Perspective: Alternative Premium Structure and Adverse Selection 
The ﬁnancial effect of the different premium structures on insurers will depend on the
revenues generated relative to the claim costs incurred. While the claim costs are
independent of the premium structure (absent ancillary or feedback effects), the revenues
depend upon the combination of the prepayment and default patterns, and the premium
structure. To evaluate the ﬁnancial effect, we construct a set of nine types of
prepayment/default patterns based upon the FHA portfolio. The nine types comprise
combinations of low, medium and high rates for both prepayments and defaults. Medium
rates are FHA average conditional prepayment and default rates. High rates are 150% of
medium, and low rates are 50% of medium. The same mix of borrowers is used for each
premium program. Premium levels are calculated such that total premium payments
generate zero net (of claim costs) present value under the average FHA prepayment and
default rates (the medium prepayment/medium default case). Exhibit 4 presents revenues
(expressed as a percent of original principal balance) for each of the termination
combinations and for each premium program, as well as claim costs for each termination
combination. The means and standard deviations are also presented.
Exhibit 5 presents the net present value of the different premium programs by
termination combination. Because premiums were set based upon average defaults and
prepayments, the net present value of the medium default/medium prepayment (M Def
M Prep) case is zero for all premium programs. If borrowers are evenly distributed among
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termination proﬁles results in average net present value across all termination
combinations different from zero. In other words, pricing based upon the mean only, not
taking into account the variance, results in biased pricing.
In fact, as illustrated in Exhibits 2 and 3, borrowers have incentives to select the
premium program most ﬁnancially beneﬁcial to them. If this self-selection is not taken
into account in pricing the programs, insurers can experience serious ﬁnancial
consequences. To take this self-selection into account, we assign a distribution of
borrowers characterized by combinations of high, medium and low default and
prepayment rates for each premium program, based upon the incentives embedded in the
total present value premium payments. We assume that the marginal distribution of
borrowers in terms of both the default and the prepayment rate categories is one half, one
third and one sixth. That is, depending upon the premium program, one half of the
borrowers are assumed to fall in the most likely default (or prepayment) rate category
(which could be high, medium, or low), one third in the next likely category, and the rest
in the least likely category. We further assume that the distribution of borrowers in terms
of default rates and in terms of prepayment rates is independent. Thus, the borrower
percentage in each of the nine combined termination rate categories is the product of the
two borrower percentages in the corresponding default rate and prepayment rate
categories. For the Annual case, the most likely borrowers are those with high default and
high prepayment rates. The borrower distribution in terms of default rates is one half of
the borrowers with high default rates (1.5 times FHA conditional rates), one third with
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Exhibit 4
Present Value under Different Prepayment and Default Patterns
Revenues
Annual Upfront Upfront Financing Claim
Only Only with Refund Upfront Cost
H Def H Prep 2.84 3.36 3.23 3.37 4.18
H Def M Prep 3.27 3.36 3.39 3.26 4.90
H Def L Prep 3.92 3.36 3.64 3.08 5.85
M Def H Prep 2.91 3.36 3.20 3.46 2.87
M Def M Prep 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36
M Def L Prep 4.05 3.36 3.62 3.20 4.04
L Def H Prep 2.98 3.36 3.17 3.56 1.47
L Def M Prep 3.46 3.36 3.34 3.48 1.74
L Def L Prep 4.20 3.36 3.60 3.32 2.09
Mean 3.44 3.36 3.39 3.34 3.39
Std Dev. 0.48 0.00 0.17 0.14 1.40
The numbers are presented as percentages of initial loan amounts. M represents the FHA mean
conditional rates; H represents 1.5 times the FHA mean conditional rates; and L represents 0.5
times the FHA mean conditional rates. The premium payments are based upon the rates that
generate zero net present values under the FHA prepayment and default rates as shown in 
Exhibit 1.medium default rates (FHA conditional rates), and one sixth with low default rates (one
half of FHA rates). The Annual case borrowers’ distribution in terms of prepayment rates
is one half with high prepayment rates, one third with medium prepayment rates, and one
sixth with low prepayment rates. Therefore, among all borrowers in the insurance pool,
25% (51/231/2) have high default and high prepayment rates, 16.67% (51/231/3) have
high default and medium prepayment rates, 8.33% (51/231/6) have high default and low
prepayment rates, 2.78% (51/631/6) have low default and low prepayment rates, and so
on. The borrowers’ distribution for the other three insurance premium cases can be
derived similarly given borrowers’ self-selection behavior. For the Upfront case, the most
likely borrowers are those with low default and low prepayment rates; for the Refund
case, those with low default and high prepayment rates; for the Financing case, those with
high default and low prepayment rates. The borrower distributions in the nine
combinations of default and prepayment rates are presented in Exhibit 6. 
Based upon the borrower distribution as shown in Exhibit 6, we can calculate the fair
premiums for each program that take borrowers’ self-selection behavior into account. We
distinguish two types of premium pricing: deterministic pricing and behavioral pricing.
In the deterministic pricing, the zero net present value premiums are calculated assuming
borrowers default and prepayment patterns follow FHA experience; in the behavioral
pricing, the premiums are determined assuming borrowers self-select into the premium
programs that are beneﬁcial to them and the borrower distribution follows those reported
in Exhibit 6. We also distinguish two types of borrower choice outcomes: static outcome
and behavioral outcome. The static outcome is the scenario that borrowers are uniformly
distributed among the nine combined termination rate categories, while the behavioral
outcome is the one that borrowers self-select so that their distribution is the same as those
reported in Exhibit 6. In Exhibit 7, we present the premium rates and the net present
values for the four sets of insurer pricing / borrower selection scenarios: (1) deterministic
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Exhibit 5
Net Present Value to the Insurer of Different Premium Structures 
Annual Upfront Upfront Financing
Only Only with Refund Upfront
H Def H Prep 21.34 20.82 20.96 20.82
H Def M Prep 21.62 21.53 21.51 21.64
H Def L Prep 21.93 22.49 22.21 22.77
M Def H Prep 0.04 0.50 0.33 0.59
M Def M Prep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M Def L Prep 0.02 20.67 20.42 20.84
L Def H Prep 1.50 1.89 1.70 2.08
L Def M Prep 1.73 1.63 1.61 1.74
L Def L Prep 2.11 1.28 1.51 1.23
Mean 0.06 20.02 0.01 20.05
Std Dev. 1.41 1.40 1.34 1.52
The numbers are presented as percentages of initial loan amounts. M represents the FHA
conditional rates; H represents 1.5 times of FHA conditional rates; and L represents 0.5 times of
FHA conditional rates. The premium payments are based upon the rates that generate zero net
present values under the FHA prepayment and default rates as shown in Exhibit 1.pricing / static outcome, (2) deterministic pricing / behavioral outcome, (3) behavioral
pricing / static outcome, and (4) behavioral pricing / behavioral outcome.
If pricing does not take self-selection into account, and estimation of the resulting net
present values ignores self-selection as well, the results indicate that premiums just about
cover claim costs for each program, with the Upfront program and the Financing program
being slightly negative and the other two programs being slightly positive (see the top
bank of numbers). If the effect of deterministic pricing is measured properly, taking into
account that borrowers will self-select, it becomes apparent that some programs will be
signiﬁcant losers (have negative net present value) and others may be signiﬁcant gainers
(second from top bank of numbers). As expected, the two programs preferred by the
majority of defaulters (the Annual program and the Financing program) are the programs
at most ﬁnancial risk due to adverse selection, having -0.48 and -0.88 net present values.
Of course, if prices are set taking into account the self-selection of borrowers, and the
measurement of the results also takes self-selection into account, then each program’s
prices exactly cover total claims cost, and the mean net present value is zero for all
programs.
Exhibits 8 and 9 display the effect of incorporating self-selection in pricing on the total
present value of premium payments by non-defaulters and defaulters by termination year
(the equivalent of Exhibits 2 and 3). As expected, the proﬁle of the total premium paid
curves is not changed by the premium adjustment, since the adjustment is essentially a
level adjustment and not a time pattern adjustment. For both non-defaulters and
defaulters, the total premium curves for the programs preferred by defaulters (the Annual
case and the Financing case) shift upward, reﬂecting the higher premium that is charged
for these programs when self-selection is taken into account. Similarly, the curves for the
programs preferred by non-defaulters shift downwards relative to pricing that does not
take self-selection into account.
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Exhibit 6
Probability Distribution Assumptions Reﬂecting Borrowers’ 
Self-Selection Behavior
Annual Upfront Upfront Financing
Only Only with Refund Upfront
H Def H Prep 25.00 2.78 8.33 8.33
H Def M Prep 16.67 5.56 5.56 16.67
H Def L Prep 8.33 8.33 2.78 25.00
M Def H Prep 16.67 5.56 16.67 5.56
M Def M Prep 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11
M Def L Prep 5.56 16.67 5.56 16.67
L Def H Prep 8.33 8.33 25.00 2.78
L Def M Prep 5.56 16.67 16.67 5.56
L Def L Prep 2.78 25.00 8.33 8.33
The numbers represent the distribution of borrowers in each of the four premium programs. For
example, in the upfront with refund program, 8.33% of the borrowers have high default and high
prepayment rates, 5.56% of the borrowers have high default and medium prepayment rates, and
so on. The construction of the borrower distribution is described in an earlier section of this
research, Insurer’s Perspective, that discusses the alternative premium structures and adverse
selection from the insurer’s perspective. Conclusions
In this study, we develop a framework for determining the premium structure of
mortgage insurance. Mortgage insurance has the unique features of being a contract with
multi-period coverage, ﬁnite life, decreasing risk over time, and high systematic
(catastrophic) risk, and is a mandatory contract to cover the risk to the lender (instead of
the borrower who pays the premium). Because of these unique features, the existing
insurance theories and premium structures in other types of insurance may not be
applicable. The framework we developed allows the insurer to calculate the premium
amount needed to cover the expected claim cost and earn economic proﬁt. The rationale
of different premium structures is analyzed as a mechanism to address the problem of
adverse selection caused by the information asymmetry between the lender and borrower
regarding the borrower’s tenure plan and level of default risk. With the combination of
upfront premiums, annual premiums and premium refunds, it is possible to reduce the
degree of cross-subsidy from stable borrowers to mobile borrowers and from low-risk
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Exhibit 7
NPV to Insurers When Premiums Are Designed with and without 
Borrower Self-Selection Behavior
Annual Upfront Upfront Financing
Only Only with Refund Upfront
Deterministic Pricing
Static Outcome
Premium Rate 0.55 3.36 4.04 3.76
Mean 0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.05
Std Dev. 1.41 1.40 1.34 1.52
Deterministic Pricing
Behavioral Outcome
Premium Rate 0.55 3.36 4.04 3.76
Mean -0.48 0.35 0.63 -0.88
Std Dev. 0.39 0.31 0.51 0.71
Behavioral Pricing
Static Outcome 
Premium Rate 0.63 3.02 3.28 4.77
Mean 0.57 -0.37 -0.63 0.86
Std Dev. 1.42 1.40 1.35 1.56
Behavioral Pricing
Behavioral Outcome
Premium Rate 0.63 3.02 3.28 4.77
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std Dev. 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.26
The numbers are presented as a percentage of the initial loan amount. Deterministic pricing
means premiums are determined by the FHA experience. Behavioral pricing means premiums are
calculated to provide zero NPVs with borrowers’ self-selection behavior. Static outcome means the
mean and standard deviations are calculated by equal weights among the nine combined
termination scenarios. Behavioral outcome means the mean and standard deviations are
calculated by having different weights for the nine scenarios to reﬂect borrowers’ preferences.RATIONALES OF MORTGAGE INSURANCE PREMIUM STRUCTURES 377
Exhibit 8
Ex-Post Present Value of Premiums Paid by Non-Defaulters 
under Behavioral Pricing
The numbers are presented as percentages of initial loan amounts. The premium payments are
based upon the rates that generate zero net present values under the FHA prepayment and default
rates shown in Exhibit 1. The rates are 0.55% per annum for the annual-only case, 3.36% for the up-
front-only case, 4.04% for the upfront with refund case, and 3.76% for the ﬁnancing upfront case.
Exhibit 9
Ex-Post Present Value of Premiums Paid by Defaulters under 
Behavioral Pricing
The numbers are presented as percentages of initial loan amounts. The premium payments are
based upon the rates that generate zero net present values under the FHA prepayment and default
rates shown in Exhibit 1. The rates are 0.55% per annum for the annual-only case, 3.36% for the up-







































































— 5 — Annual Only — l — Upfront Only
—A— Financing Upfront — 3 — Upfront Refund
— 5 — Annual Only — l — Upfront Only
—A— Financing Upfront — 3 — Upfront Refundborrowers to high-risk borrowers. However, upfront premiums tend to increase home-
buyer downpayment burdens and decrease housing affordability. For most mortgage
insurers with a social mission, the amount of upfront premiums to charge would depend
on the trade-off between economic and social beneﬁts.
We ﬁnd that an important determinant of the effect of premium structures on
borrowers and insurers is the extent to which either of the two forms of subsidization is
inherent in the structure: (1) termination year subsidization and (2) extra defaulter
subsidization. Interestingly, the same premium structure may have very different
subsidization implication for prepayers and defaulters. 
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